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Abstract
Purpose In this article, we aim to present and defend a contextual approach to math-
ematical explanation.
Method To do this, we introduce an epistemic reading of mathematical explanation.
Results The epistemic reading not only clarifies the link between mathematical expla-
nation and mathematical understanding, but also allows us to explicate some contextual
factors governing explanation. We then show how several accounts of mathematical
explanation can be read in this approach.
Conclusion The contextual approach defended here clears up the notion of explanation
and pushes us (at least for now) towards a pluralist vision on mathematical explanation.
Keywords Mathematical explanation  Mathematical understanding 
Contextualism  Pluralism
Introduction
Mancosu (2008) differentiates between two senses ofmathematical explanation,which
are both investigated in philosophy of mathematics. The first sense concerns
mathematical explanation in the natural or social sciences. Considering the role
mathematics plays in our scientific endeavours, clarifying the connection between
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mathematics and the world is an important philosophical challenge. For example, there
is an unresolved debate about whether mathematics can genuinely explain a physical
phenomenon or merely represent it. Mancosu’s second sense concerns mathematical
explanation inside mathematics. The underlying idea in this topic is that not all
mathematical activity is driven by justificatory aims. For instance, while all proofs show
that a theorem is true, some proofs go further and also show why a theorem is true.
Several mathematicians and philosophers of mathematics have called the latter an
explanatory proof. Philosophical accounts of explanation aim to clarify what it means
for a proof to be explanatory. It is this latter sense which we will focus on in this paper.
In ‘‘A Contextual Approach’’, we will outline our contextual account of
mathematical explanation. Contextualism comes quite natural, we will argue, once
we read explanation as involving a recipient to which it must give understanding (an
epistemic, rather than an ontic reading). Because a proof is only explanatory relative
to the agent’s understanding of it, two contextual factors pertaining to the agent will
be discussed: (1) How well a proof transmits understanding, depending on the
background/skill corpus K of the agent, and (2) whether the proof transmits
understanding within the particular epistemic interests of the agent.
‘‘Accounts of Mathematical Explanation’’ explores those same ideas by applying
them to several accounts of explanation, namely those of Steiner, Cellucci and
Lange. We show an epistemic and contextual reading of each of them and give an
illustration from mathematical practice.
The reasonwe discuss not one but several accounts of explanationwill be argued for in
‘‘Embracing Pluralism’’. No single account of mathematical explanation has, at present,
managed to capture everything that is mathematically valuable about an explanatory
proof. Ergo,we believe it unwise, at present, to limit ourself to anyone of themandwould
rather accept a (heuristic) pluralism about the accounts ofmathematical explanation to be
considered in dubbing a proof as explanatory. Furthermore,we believe the value of a type
of mathematical understanding (and the type of explanation that grants it) may
themselves vary with context, which could be expressed as a third contextual factor.
A Contextual Approach
The Ontic and Epistemic Distinction
Before we explore accounts of explanation, we believe it fruitful to this
phenomenon from the perspective of the ontic/epistemic approaches. This is a
distinction borrowed from Salmon (1984) in the debate about scientific explanation.
Within the literature on mathematical explanation, talk about epistemic or ontic
approaches is absent. Our aim here is to use the epistemic approach in order to
clarify some relevant aspects about the study of mathematical explanation that have
hitherto remained overlooked or neglected. The ontic conception, following
Salmon, sees explanations as ‘exhibitions of the ways in which what is to be
explained fits into natural patterns or regularities’ (1984: p. 293), while ‘the
epistemic conception takes scientific explanations to be arguments’ (ibidem). More
generally, ontic versions of explanation see the locus of explanation as that which
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produces the explanandum, while epistemic versions see the locus of explanation as
that which makes the explanandum intelligible to an inquirer.
In philosophy of science, ontic views take scientific explanation to be fully
objective things in the world, distinguished from the statements or arguments
reporting this actual explanation. For causal accounts of explanation, this means a
given phenomenon is explained by the set of causal facts, and not by the scientific
representation of these facts.1 Epistemic views, on the other hand, believe that
scientific explanation can only take the form of communicative acts, texts or
representations. These views see explanation as a human activity that is deeply
connected with understanding. Rather than being full-blooded things in the world,
explanations have the purpose to increase our knowledge about the world.
A mathematical proof can be seen as an argument by which one convinces
oneself or others that something is true, so it might seem hard to go beyond
epistemic talk about an explanatory proof. However, while the content of any
particular proof is the fruit of a person’s epistemic work, it can be separated as an
object independent of a particular mind. Other people can read this proof and be
convinced by it. This leads us to the question whether showing why a theorem is
true is a feature of the proof itself or a feature of communicative acts, texts or
representations. This can be fleshed out as the difference between ontic and
epistemic approaches:
An account of explanation is ontic if it states:
Proof P of theorem t has explanatory value if and only if P itself is the
explanans of t regardless of whether it gives understanding to any particular
agent.
An account of explanation is epistemic if it states:
Proof P of theorem t has explanatory value if and only if the explanans
consists of arguments (in the broad sense) including P that grants
understanding of t for a particular agent S.
This distinction has consequences for the study of explanatory proofs in
mathematics. While not every agent will be capable of grasping the explanation, this
fact does not change the explanatoriness of the proof for the ontic account. Ontic
accounts have to specify which characteristics a proof has or lacks in order to
distinguish explanatory from non-explanatory proofs. The truth of ‘Proof P is
explanatory’ is independent of a particular recipient’s (epistemic agent) response to
(i.e. understanding of) it. This leads to the following statement:2
An account of explanation is ontic if there can be no statement:
‘Proof P explains theorem t’ is true relative to person S and not true relative to
person S0.
1 See, for example, Craver (2014: p. 40).
2 As inspired by Khalifa (2016).
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This is not the case for epistemic accounts of mathematical explanation. Like the
ontic approach, the characteristics a mathematical proof has (or lacks) can and
should still be taken into consideration in the epistemic approach, but, unlike the
ontic approach, they always have an agent’s response (i.e. understanding) coupled to
them. Since we only speak of explanation if the agent reaches understanding, the
answer to the question whether a proof is explanatory does not proceed in the same
way for the epistemic as it does for the ontic approach. The truth of ‘Proof P is
explanatory’ is relative to the particular recipient’s response to (i.e. understanding
of) it. This leads to the alternate statement:
An account of explanation is epistemic if there can be a statement:
‘Proof P explains theorem t’ is true relative to person S and not true relative to
person S0.
It is important to mention that ontic approaches do not necessarily deny the
relation between explanation and understanding. In fact, ‘virtually every theory of
explanation also places a premium on the power of an explanation to produce
understanding’ (Trout 2005), but the crucial difference is that, for the ontic
approach, that relation does not play the role of identifying something as an
explanation. It may, for example, be the case that there is an explanation, but
nobody understands it. Epistemic views, as we presented them, do start with the idea
that there is a fundamental relation and that it is thus meaningless to speak of an
explanation in that case. In this paper, we will build upon an epistemic approach to
mathematical explanation.
Understanding
In spite of the intimate link between explanation and understanding, philosophers
have had doubts about the philosophical relevance of the notion of understanding. A
major cause of concern is the assimilation of understanding with the subjective ‘aha-
feeling’. This concern has been raised by Hempel (1965) and Trout (2002), who
state that the feeling of understanding is not at all a reliable cue for genuine
understanding. They argue that this feeling of understanding might be an interesting
topic for psychology but has no place in the philosophical analysis of explanation.
The feeling of understanding may be its most familiar and salient aspect, but it is
almost unanimously agreed that it is neither necessary nor sufficient for genuine
understanding (Wilkenfeld 2013).
Waskan (2011) instead argues for a ‘success’ interpretation of (scientific)
understanding which goes beyond merely feeling we understand the world. How we
determine understanding as successful, whether it is in science or mathematics, is a
philosophical and not a psychological topic. Most positive accounts of understand-
ing either explicitly (Avigad 2008; Sierpinska 1994) or implicitly (de Regt and
Dieks 2005) defend a functional ‘success’ interpretation: When an agent S
understands X, we attribute that agent certain abilities concerning X. While a
number of people equate understanding with mental states (or representations)
instead of abilities, abilities are invariably present as part of the account, be it as
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symptom or trait. We do not wish to deny mental states playing a role in
understanding, but, to characterize success, we find more solid ground in the
possession of abilities as opposed to inaccessible, theoretical mental states. In short,
we can attribute understanding to someone with successful abilities without
knowledge of mental states, but not vice versa. This leads to the following definition
of understanding that we shall be working with:
‘Agent3 S understands X’ corresponds to ‘agent S possesses particular abilities
related to X’.
Having defined understanding in such a way entails that we can (in principle) list
all abilities relevant to understanding. Avigad (2008) has listed some (general)
abilities involved in understanding a mathematical proof, such as: responding to
challenges as to the correctness of it, identifying key features, identifying the nature
of the objects and questions, mustering the relevant background knowledge,
exploring the space of possibilities fruitfully and so on. The particular object of
understanding under consideration in this paper is that of a theorem and more
specifically understanding why the theorem is true. This corresponds to what an
explanatory proof grants. Combining this reading of understanding with the
epistemic reading of explanation, we get:
A proof P of theorem t has explanatory value if and only if it grants agent S
abilities appropriate to understanding why t is true.
Since we have said that an explanatory proof P of theorem t is one which gives
understanding of why-t (relative to an agent), it follows that an explanatory proof is
one which grants the agent abilities appropriate to understanding why-t.4 Further
clarifications will follow once we discuss examples of accounts of explanation.
Contextualism
A benefit of adopting the epistemic approach is that it gives a perfect set-up to make
context-dependent claims about explanation. For the ontic approach, the truth value
of ‘Proof P explains theorem t’ is absolute, meaning proof P would explain theorem
t (or not) for all agents. Under the epistemic approach, absolutes are (in principle)
possible, meaning there can exist a P which gives understanding of why theorem t is
true to all agents, but this need not at all be the case. In fact, it clearly is not the case
for a lot of proofs; not every mathematician attains the same abilities from them.
Given this, we are in need of a contextual reading of ‘Proof P explains theorem t’
3 We use ‘agent’ in a broad enough sense to include all entities with non-trivial mathematical intentions
and actions, being they a single human mathematician, a cooperative community or a sophisticated
automated theorem prover.
4 This leads to the following difference between the two: While understanding is the possession of
abilities, explanation is the message that transfers them. This implies that having an explanation leads to
understanding (for agent S), but does not imply the converse. An agent who understands will have the
abilities granted by an explanation, but does not necessarily have an explanation (at least in the message-
ready sense, although the substance is certainly present).
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that allows us to specify when and why abilities are attained. In that spirit, we now
wish to present two contextual factors.
Contextual Factor K (Background/Skill Corpus)
In order to grasp (or develop) the argument of a proof, an agent needs to have a
background/skill corpus fertile for it. The skills and background that the agent
possesses are crucial elements in determining whether a proof will be successful in
providing understanding. In the context of a particular agent S and more specifically
its background/corpus K, the explanatory value of a proof can be high because the
specific features of the proof match his or her specific background and/or skills in
such a way that an understanding why the theorem is true can be attained. For
another agent S0, with another corpus K0 (i.e. another context), the explanatory value
of the same proof might be weaker, if not entirely absent, simply because the agent
S0 misses relevant background knowledge and/or skill to work with the proof. Note
that we are not hereby saying that an explanatory proof must necessarily be the
easiest or the most readily accessible. We do not see background/skill corpus K as
static, thus allowing the possibility for a proof to become explanatory in lieu of
some work. However, not until the work is done and K is fertile, will the proof be
properly explanatory. In short, the explanatory value of a proof needs to be
evaluated in the light of an agent’s background/skill corpus K. This is a sort of
‘success’ criterion for understanding based on an proof/corpus couple (P, K).
What we’ve said so far is that proof P won’t be sufficient for granting
understanding across all agents. However, we have reason to believe a particular
proof P need not be necessary either. Nothing forces us to think the ability/abilities
of understanding why a theorem is true can only be attained by a single proof. The
same ability may be attained by different proofs (for different or even the same
agent). In short, success depends on the agent S, by virtue of the couple (P, K).5
Contextual Factor I (Epistemic Interests)
We have mentioned that explaining why a theorem t is true can be translated to
granting abilities appropriate to understanding why-t. If one would need to list all
the abilities that are appropriate to understanding why-t, this would involve
variations among several domains,6 not all of which are of equal interest to every
agent. If an agent has interests within a particular domain, then we call those
epistemic interests and we denote them with I. I is then a particular perspective of
questions to look at t. Having I as a contextual factor can help specify which
abilities appropriate to understanding why t is under consideration. Generally, we
expect an agent to have epistemic interests which successfully fit with their
background/skill corpus, but this needn’t be so. An agent may have interests outside
5 We call the contextual factor K without mention of P because the sentence under consideration is
‘Proof P explains theorem t’, which holds P constant. If the sentence was ‘Theorem t is explained’, then
the couple (P,K) would be the contextual factor.
6 There are different ways by which domains can be differentiated, e.g. by historically, by school of
thought, by mathematical subdisciplines.
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of their (current) background/skill. Therefore, it seems appropriate to have I as a
separate contextual factor.
Two agents S and S0 may have different epistemic interests I and I0, each of
which specify different abilities that will be sufficient to understanding why theorem
t is true. Whether P explains theorem t for S will depend not only on the success of
the couple (P, K), but on whether the success captures the epistemic interests I.7 A
couple of illustrations are given in ‘‘Accounts of Mathematical Explanation’’. In
short, the domains that are of interest can differ with context I and specify which
abilities involved in understanding why-t are important. We propose, therefore, that
the explanatory value of a proof to be evaluated in the light of epistemic interest I.
Accounts of Mathematical Explanation
In this section, we look at the state of the art in the literature on mathematical
explanation. One of the most influential accounts, leading to a renewed interest in
the topic mathematical explanation during the last few decades, is provided by
Steiner (1978). Cellucci (2008) and Lange (2014) propose two alternative accounts.
These three accounts will be presented in this section. As we will argue, each of
these accounts can be read from the epistemic and contextual approach developed
earlier. In order to display the legitimacy of our contextual approach, we will
present a case for each account highlighting the role of epistemic interest in
explanatory endeavours.
Steiner
Account
To draw a distinction between explanatory and non-explanatory proofs, Steiner
(1978) introduces the notion of a characterizing property: a property unique to a
given entity or structure within a family or domain of such entities or structures. An
explanatory proof is a proof that depends on a characterizing property of an entity or
structure mentioned in the theorem. But merely pointing to this characterizing
property is not enough. One must be able to generate new, related proofs by varying
the property (substituting it with the characterizing property of a related entity)
while holding the proof idea constant. As an example, we present a proof of the
Pythagorean theorem, which Weber and Verhoeven (2002) offer as a case fitting
Steiner’s account.
Theorem For a right triangle with legs a and b and hypotenuse c, a2 ? b2 = c2.
Proof
(1) For every triangle ABC: a2 ? b2 - 2ab cos(a, b) = c2.
7 If epistemic interests can differ, we have an additional reason why different proofs can, contextually, be
of explanatory value—namely that they render abilities belonging to different epistemic interests.
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(2) For every angle h: cos (h) = 0 if h = 90.
(3) For every right-angled triangle ABC with hypotenuse c: (a, b) = 90.
(4) Hence, for every right-angled triangle ABC with hypotenuse c: a2 ? b2 = c2.
This is both a valid proof of Pythagorean theorem and fits the criteria provided by
Steiner to count as an explanatory proof. First of all, it makes reference to the
characterizing property of an entity mentioned in the theorem, namely the fact that a
right-angled triangle has an angle that equals 90. This identifies it uniquely in the
family of triangles. Moreover, the proof depends on this fact in the sense it is used to
deduce the Pythagorean theorem from the law of cosines. Finally, we can generate
new related theorems by holding the proof idea constant and varying it with the
characterizing properties of other entities of the family. For example, we can derive
that for all obtuse triangles c2[ a2 ? b2.
Ontic and Epistemic Reading
Let us take a step back and present both an ontic and an epistemic reading of
Steiner’s account. We stated that an ontic account classifies a proof as having
explanatory value by only looking at features of the proof itself. A proof is
explanatory if it fits certain criteria, meaning that the proof itself is the explanans of
the theorem. For Steiner, this would entail the following two criteria:
• The proof makes reference to, and depends on, a characterizing property of an
entity or structure that is mentioned in the theorem.
• The proof is deformable, meaning that replacement of the characterizing
property with a characterizing property of a related entity or structure leads to a
related theorem.
An epistemic account classifies a proof as having explanatory value if and only if
the explanations are arguments including P that grant understanding of t for a
particular agent. For Steiner, this would entail the following arguments/activities:
• Identifying an entity or structure mentioned in the theorem and a family of
related entities or structures.
• Inspecting the proof and indicating what characterizing property is used in the
proof.
• Seeing how the theorem changes in response to replacing the characterizing
property with characterizing properties of entities or structures from the family.
What gives the explanation, in this view, is not merely the proof, but a family of
related proofs and an argument which highlights a specific aspect of each proof that
makes them related in a particular way. We also stipulated that, under the epistemic
reading, an explanation gives understanding, where understanding was seen as
possessing particular abilities related to the theorem. Our reading of Steiner’s
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account can lead to an agent possessing some abilities out of this (not exhaustive
list8 of):
• The ability to see that the theorem holds for a specific entity or structure within a
family of entities or structures.
• The ability to motivate how a specific property of this entity or structure
contributes to the truth of the theorem.
• The ability to give a similar argument for theorems about related entities or
structures.
The analysis of Steiner’s account through these two approaches reveals a tension
in it. Steiner does not talk about an agent or the contextual factors that are related to
introducing an agent in his account of explanation. Neither are epistemic benefits,
such as understanding, discussed. This seems to suggest, without making this
explicit, that Steiner has an ontic view in mind. Alternatively the requirement for a
characterizing property to be found and a proof to be deformable suggests that
actual activities or arguments from an agent are part of the explanans.
Contextual Factors K and I
The agent’s skills and background knowledge are crucial elements in our epistemic
and contextual framework to mathematical explanation. This can be fleshed out in
our adaptation of Steiner’s account as well. Without knowledge in geometry and
trigonometry, and the skill to manipulate symbolic statements, one would be
incapable of constructing or grasping the explanation of the Pythagorean theorem as
sketched above.
Moreover, a specific epistemic interest gives voice to this explanation. Instead of
searching for the ability to give a similar argument for the Pythagorean theorem and
the related theorem(s) about the relation between squares constructed on the sides of
acute or obtuse triangles, one could be interested in giving similar argument about
areas of the faces of a tetrahedron in three-dimensional Euclidean argument. In that
case, another argument would be given, possibly based on another proof. The fact
that there are multiple ways to characterize a mathematical entity or structure is
something Steiner already recognized:
We have thus a relative notion, since a given entity can be part of a number of
differing domains or families. Even in a single domain, entities may be
characterized multiply (Steiner 1978: p. 143. Emphasis added).
But while Steiner seemingly concludes that all the proofs that fit his criteria are
explanatory, we propose that explanatory value of a proof needs to be evaluated in
the light of the agent’s epistemic interest. We give an example from mathematical
practice in the following section.
8 An exhaustive list, if possible, would include the ability to (re)construct a proof of the theorem, but,
with the following list, we wish to draw focus on the abilities beyond justification.
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Illustration from Practice
As an example, we look at the different approaches from Dedekind and Kronecker,
who both published pathbreaking works on algebraic number theory. Roughly at the
same time, they tackled the same problems, but each within their own characteristic
approach:
What should not pass unnoticed, however, is the very existence of two theories
that developed at the same time as answers to one and the same question, but
which nevertheless display very different perspectives and spirit. Kronecker
and Dedekind were faced with the same body of mathematical knowledge, but
approached it through different systems of well-defined and consistent images
of knowledge; their contributions to the consequent expansion of the body of
knowledge were sensibly different (Corry 2012: p. 120).
It is hard to compare the incommensurable background assumptions of these two
mathematicians. These differences can be located at the metaphysical level, for
example Dedekind’s choice to use axiomatic notions and the infinite as opposed to
Kronecker’s view on mathematics as constructive and finitary. Reck’s (2009)
analysis of Dedekind’s work, as well as its relation to understanding, includes a
comparison between Dedekind and Kronecker on the local level of proofs. Reck
uses Steiner’s account of explanation for this investigation. Moreover, Reck also
sees successful explanation as what improves our understanding, which ties in
nicely with our reading of Steiner. What is most interesting for the scope of this
paper, however, is how Reck illustrates that starting from the same question ‘Why
are certain kinds of algebraic equations solvable by integers while others aren’t?’,
Dedekind and Kronecker differ in the way they would give their explanation:
For Kronecker, the contrast class consists of a tightly circumscribed range of
equations, corresponding to number fields constructed finitistically; and the
presupposed factors are computational ones. For Dedekind, the contrast class
is determined by an enlarged class of number fields, thus consisting of a larger
number of equations; and the relevant explanatory factors involve entities
defined set theoretically and considered structurally. Altogether, the most
radical differences between Dedekind’s and Kronecker’s approaches can be
located at this level, I would suggest. They consist of differences in the general
background assumptions for their respective explanatory enterprises (Reck
2009: p. 165).
Some further clarification is needed. Reck uses the notion of contrast class, a
notion often used in discussions about scientific explanation.9 The goal of
specifying a contrast class is showing why something, rather than an alternative,
is true. This is analogous to Steiner’s idea of a related family of structures and
entities. The contrast class is what differs for Dedekind and Kronecker. The quote
also mentions relevant explanatory factors, which likewise point to different
preferences of where the explanation needs to be searched. Evidently, this has an
9 See, for example, van Fraassen’s (1980) pragmatic theory of explanation.
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effect on which characterizing properties are considered. We argue that these
differences are due to distinct epistemic interests.
Steiner’s account revolves around the questions of what is considered as a family
of related entities or structures and what is considered as a characterizing property.
In our view, this can be filled in different ways depending on the context. Rather
than stating that all proofs that fit certain criteria are explanatory proofs in itself,
some proofs will be explanatory for Dedekind, and other proofs will be explanatory
for Kronecker. Further investigation is needed to get a better grip on specific cases,
and these can be used to adjust Steiner’s account where necessary. But the case of
Dedekind and Kronecker nicely illustrates how descriptive claims about the
explanatory value of a proof should always be accompanied with specification of an
agent’s skill and background knowledge and his/her epistemic aims.
Cellucci
Account
Cellucci (2008) argues that explanatory reasoning, which aims to show why
something is true, is connected with the analytic method. The core of the analytic
method is that one solves a problem by making (plausible) hypotheses, usually
obtained by a mixture of both deductive and inductive inferences. The idea is to find
a hypothesis that is a sufficient condition for the mathematical problem. Hypotheses
are always subject to revision. Cellucci contrasts this kind of reasoning with the
axiomatic method, which consists of obtaining a result from axioms and rules of
inference. In this method, axioms are to be taken as absolutely true. Cellucci claims
that this kind of reasoning only shows that something is the case without showing
why. In terms of the analytic method, Cellucci also argues what an explanation
would then consist of:
A hypothesis provides an explanation of a problem if it plays an essential role
in solving it, in the sense that it reveals an aspect of the problem that is
essential to a solution of the problem. In that sense, an explanatory hypothesis
is strictly connected with the problem (Cellucci 2008: p. 206. Emphasis
added).
An example Cellucci discusses is the problem to demonstrate the Pythagorean
theorem (Cellucci 2008: p. 207). To solve this problem, he proposes, within a wider
argument, to use the hypothesis that the sum of three interior angles of a triangle is
equal to two right angles. What is crucial for Cellucci is that this hypothesis is not
only capable of solving the problem at hand, but plays an essential role in solving
the problem. In this way, it explains why the Pythagorean theorem is the case. This
is not the case for all arguments that lead to the Pythagorean theorem: ‘Thus,
although the Pythagorean theorem can be proved from the axioms of set theory, the
latter do not provide an explanation of the problem posed by the Pythagorean
theorem since they play no essential role in solving the problem [in the sense it
reveals an aspect of the problem essential to its solution]’ (Cellucci 2008: p. 206).
J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res.
123
Author's personal copy
Epistemic Reading
Cellucci’s account can be interpreted in our epistemic approach as well. This would
go as follows: Firstly, what gives the actual explanation goes beyond proof. A
broader argument is given by:
• Identifying the exact role of premises and/or auxiliary assumptions (instead of
treating them as a given).
• Identifying how a premise or an assumption reveals an aspect that is essential for
producing the theorem.
This can be restated as abilities concerning understanding why the theorem is the
case. Abilities that are central to this account are:
• The ability to motivate which premise or auxiliary assumption is essentially
connected with the theorem.
• The ability to highlight an essential aspect this premise or assumption reveals
that leads to the theorem.
Contextual Factors K and I
Cellucci can also be read in our contextual framework. In order to highlight the
relevance of a step, an agent has to have certain knowledge and skills (contextual factor
K). Moreover, the agent’s epistemic interest (contextual factor I) can have an influence
on what is seen as essential or not. Cellucci seems to acknowledge this possibility:
That the very same thing may have distinct reasons, thus distinct explanations,
depending on the fact that problems have many sides, so they can be seen from
distinct perspectives, each of which suggests a distinct hypothesis, thus a
distinct explanation. Any hypothesis establishes a connection between the
problem and a distinct body of knowledge, thus revealing a new essential
aspect of the problem (Cellucci 2008: p. 206).
Cellucci does not further develop this into a particular aspect of his account, but
we do and believe it is important to do so. To emphasize the importance of
including epistemic interests, we offer an example from mathematical practice
where it makes a difference whether one is rooted in an algebraic or geometrical
way or reasoning.
Illustration from Practice
During the nineteenth century, the majority of mathematicians eschewed the use of
diagrams or graphs and had a clear preference for symbolic manipulation in order to
prove results.10 The downgrading had of course to do with the post-Kantian mistrust
10 For an interesting overview on the status of visualization in historical periods of logic and
mathematics, see Mancosu (2005).
J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res.
123
Author's personal copy
of geometric intuition that flowed from failing in facilitating comprehension, which
was forcefully illustrated by the conception, e.g. by Weierstrass, of continuous
functions that are nowhere differentiable, hence not allowing for any visual
representation. Visuals were thus deemed unnecessary at best, misleading at worst.
The ideal of formal proof that was developed and embraced from that period was
that of a logical sequence of symbolic sentences.
The approach of Weierstrass to mathematics, which insists on logical purity, can
be seen as a specific epistemic interest. If we would use Cellucci’s notions (of
essential aspects to be revealed) in this case, they would need to be aspects about the
algebraic nature of mathematical problems:
We shall give a purely arithmetical definition of complex magnitudes. The
geometrical representation of the complex magnitudes is regarded by many
mathematicians not as an explanation, but only as a sensorial representation,
while the arithmetical representation is a real explanation of the complex
magnitudes (Weierstrass in a 1874 lecture, quoted from Ferreiro´s 2007: p. 211.
Emphasis added).
It is with these epistemic interests that Weierstrass presented what is now known
as the Weierstrass function. Weierstrass believed that algebraic truths give a
systematic theoretical foundation for function theory.11 This resulted in a proof of
continuous non-differentiable functions and continued to abandon visual intuition as
a secure guide in the development of mathematics. But not everyone in the
mathematical community wished to follow the same path. Von Koch published a
paper in 1904 in which he concedes that the example of Weierstrass has shown that
continuous and nowhere differentiable functions exist, but he finds an essential
aspect to remain hidden:
It seems to me that his example is not satisfactory from the geometrical point
of view since the function is defined by an analytic12 expression that hides the
geometrical nature of the corresponding curve and so from this point of view
does not see why the curve has no tangent (Quoted from translation Edgar
1993: p. 26. Emphasis added).
Von Koch’s geometrical approach to this problem, which results in his famous
Snowflake as a visual representation of an early fractal, was genuinely geometrical.
Its construction process revealed the geometrical nature of fractals, which remained
hidden in the purely logical proof.
These examples show that there is contextual variation of epistemic interest
which would determine when an essential aspect of a mathematical problem is
revealed.
11 See Weierstrass’ letter to his colleague Schwarz, cited from Bottazzini (2001).
12 Not to be confused with Cellucci’s use of the term analytic.
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Lange
Account
Lange (2014) argues that the distinction between explanatory and non-explanatory
proofs is in the way the proof extracts a theorem from its premises. The theorem
should be seen in terms of a set-up or problem on the one hand and a result on the
other hand. For theorems of the kind All F’s are G’s, the set-up involves F’s
instantiation and the result involves G’s instantiation. Results have a feature that,
once salient, prompts for an explanation. Proofs which exploit this feature in the set-
up are recognized as explaining why the theorem holds.
A first example, based on proofs of a theorem from probability theory, is one
where ‘a mathematical result that exhibits symmetry of a certain kind is explained
by a proof showing how it follows from a similar symmetry in the problem. Each of
these symmetries consists of some sort of invariance under a given transformation’
(Lange 2014: p. 496. Emphasis added). The core idea is that a proof appealing to an
underlying symmetry in the set-up counts as explanatory exactly because the
symmetry in the result struck us in the first place. He gives several examples where
this feature is a puzzling symmetry, and argues that proofs exploiting a symmetry in
the problem are recognized as explaining why the theorem holds. But symmetry is
not necessarily the only feature. Other features such as unity and simplicity of the
result could likewise be salient. This leads to the question whether, for that feature
of the result, a proof can be found which exploits the same kind of feature in the set-
up.
Lange gives the following example for the feature unity. When one takes an
ordinary calculator keyboard, one can see that all numbers belonging to a certain
type of ‘calculator number13’ share a certain property.14 Lange states that a case-by-
case proof treats this as a coincidental result. Obtaining a result that applies to every
single calculator number, on the other hand, proceeds from a property common to
each of these numbers and shows why the unity of the result is not a coincidence at
all.
Epistemic Reading
Lange’s account can, in addition to Steiner’s and Cellucci’s account, be adapted into
our epistemic approach. Firstly, the actual explanation goes beyond the proof. A
broader argument consists of:
• Recognizing a salient feature in both the result and the set-up.
• Showing how this feature is invariant to the transformations of the proof.
13 A calculator number is here a six-digit number that is constructed by taking the three digits on any
row, column or main diagonal of the keyboard in forward and then reverse order. For the detailed
overview of this case, see (Lange 2014: pp. 487–489).
14 The property here is being divisible by 37.
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Secondly, this can be restated as abilities concerning understanding why the
theorem is the case. Abilities that are central to this account are:
• The ability to recognize a salient feature in both the result and the set-up.
• The ability to demonstrate how a noteworthy feature in the theorem is related to
a similar feature in the premises.
Contextual Factors K and I
Lange sees an important contextual aspect in his account. A proof will only be
considered as explanatory in a context where an agent is able to recognize a feature
as being salient:
The distinction between proofs that explain why some theorem holds and
proofs that merely establish that it holds exists only when some feature of the
result being proved is salient. That feature’s salience makes certain proofs
explanatory. A proof is accurately characterized as an explanation (or not)
only in a context where some feature of the result being proved is salient
(Lange 2014: p. 507).
Undoubtedly, the background and skill corpus affects the ability to recognize
such features. As we already mentioned, Lange takes into account that several
features can be seen as salient. One of the possible features, next to symmetry, he
discusses is unity. In the next section, we give an example of how the recognition of
this feature depends on epistemic interests.
Illustration from Practice
The quest for unity is a strong driving force in mathematical work. Mathematicians
strive for theorems that state properties of all the members of classes of interest. A
major unifying concept in mathematics, introduced at the end of the nineteenth and
beginning of the twentieth century, is that of a set. Ever since, alternative routes
have been explored to seek a conceptual framework within which all mathematical
results can be viewed. Take, for example group theory and category theory:
Having proved, using only the group axioms, that group inverses are unique,
we know that this fact will apply to every single example of a group. No
further work is required. If tomorrow you come across a quite new kind of
mathematical structure, and you determine that what you have is a group, you
will know at once that every element of your group has a single inverse. In
fact, you will know that your newly discovered structure possesses every
property that can be established - in abstract form - on the basis of the group
axioms alone (Devlin 2000: p. 193).
Our theory provides general concepts applicable to all branches of
mathematics, and so contributes to the current trend towards uniform
treatment of different mathematical disciplines. In particular it provides
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opportunities for the comparison of constructions and of the isomorphism
occurring in different branches of mathematics (Eilenberg and MacLane 1945:
p. 236).
All of these routes have their own way of tracing unity in mathematical results.
Set theory emphasizes membership, while category theory emphasizes function;
group theory joins groups by group homomorphisms, while topos theory joins
topological spaces by continuous maps. Research in a certain field focuses on a
particular type of unity. Moreover, category theory is affectionately known as
abstract nonsense due to its highly abstract concepts. This high level of abstraction
is shared by other unifying theories, but reference to highly abstract concepts will
not always be telling or preferred. It is clear that Lange’s example of calculator
numbers locates a far more concrete type of unity. Consequently, epistemic interests
cannot be detached from the question which unity is considered to be a striking
feature and will also designate the direction in which a similar unity in the set-up
will be searched.
Embracing Pluralism
We have seen three accounts of explanation and adapted them to our epistemic and
contextual framework. The epistemic account fleshed out types of activities and
arguments that form the explanation of the theorem and specified the type of
abilities involved to understand the theorem. Illustrations from practice conveyed
the importance of including contextual factors such as the epistemic interest.
But this leaves us with an important question. Do we really need all three
accounts, and perhaps even other accounts in the philosophical literature, to say
something about mathematical explanation? Steiner had the idea that his account
could potentially grasp all mathematical explanations: ‘Perhaps all mathematical
explanations, then, may be treated similarly’ (Steiner 1978: p. 148). Lange and
Cellucci distance themselves from Steiner and seem to intend, although they do not
say so explicitly, to take his place as a potential monist account of mathematical
explanation.
At face value, the multiplicity of types of arguments and abilities we explicated
in ‘‘Accounts of Mathematical Explanation’’ are all mathematically valuable.
Moreover, they are not simply reducible to each other, so there is no single account
of explanation that exhausts the arguments or abilities. Some differences are:
• Steiner sees mathematical explanation as being provided within a family of
related proofs, and Lange and Cellucci do not require a relationship with other
proofs.
• Cellucci’s explanatory hypothesis can reveal a connection between entities or
structures in the theorem, and Steiner’s characterizing property has to be about
an entity or structure mentioned in the theorem.
• Lange requires that the striking feature that needs explanation must have a
feature of the same kind in the set-up, and Cellucci’s explanatory feature can
reveal how another feature reveals something essential.
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At this point, we have several accounts of explanation but no clear evidence that
one of them captures all cases of explanatory proofs in mathematics. Rather than
presupposing that there necessarily is a single overarching account for mathematical
explanation, we suggest to follow another path. Instead of restricting ourselves to a
monist view, we propose pluralism (about types of explanation and its correspond-
ing understanding) as a heuristic stance.15 In principle, every account of
mathematical explanation will admit an epistemic, contextual reading with
context-dependent claims. Philosophical reflection and the analysis of specific case
studies16 can be used to further adapt existing accounts of explanation or develop
new accounts. It may be the case that in the end of this investigation only one
account remains, rendering all others superfluous, but at this point we have no
reason to believe that this will be the case. An author who also adopts this kind of
position is Pincock:
I will proceed cautiously and set aside the strong claim that there is only one
kind of explanatory proof. Instead, I will allow that there might be many ways
to arrive at an explanatory proof. My focus, then, is on a restricted class of
explanatory proofs that I will call abstract mathematical explanations (Pincock
2015: p. 2).
Hafner and Mancosu (2005) discuss two alternative approaches to investigate the
nature of mathematical explanation: top down or bottom up. The former approach
consists of starting with a general model of explanation and consequently testing
how well they account for mathematical practice. In the latter approach, one avoids
any prior commitment to a particular model and tries to find recurrent types of
explanation in the practice. They favour the bottom-up approach, because the top
down would often mean ‘forcing the evidence from mathematical practice into a
predefined mould, thereby narrowing the perspective from the outset and probably
leading to distortions’ (Hafner and Mancosu 2005: p. 221). We are sympathetic to
this worry. A top-down monist view would lead to the misunderstanding or
disregard of cases of genuine mathematical explanations that do not fit a particular
account of explanation. The bottom-up approach, on the other hand, looks at cases
from actual mathematical practice without a commitment to a specific account of
explanation. It is our view that an optimal use of this approach requires a pluralistic
stance: Either this case fits an existing account, which can count as evidence for its
value and/or can lead to an adaptation, or this case does not fit an existing account,
which gives rise to the proposal of a new account. Hence, the pluralist stance as a
heuristic guideline does not entail ‘anything goes’, where any arbitrary account of
explanation is beyond criticism or revision. Rather, it encourages the optimal use of
the resources provided by the philosophical literature in order to get a grip on what
mathematical explanation could mean.
15 See Weber et al (2013) for a similar argument about pluralism towards scientific explanation.
16 For a discussion about the value of both an analytical and reflective approach to mathematical
explanation, see Weber and Frans (2016).
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Concluding Remarks
In the first section, we stipulated that agents can have diverging epistemic interests,
but we do not exclude the possibility that they may have diverging understanding
interests as well. These interests will determine which type(s) of explanation (E, E0,
etc) and corresponding understanding (U, U0, etc) are contextually appropriate for
consideration.17 Note that we do not want to make the claim that each agent or
community must have his own particular account of explanation. Instead, each agent
or community may consider one or several types of understanding (U as rendered by
type of explanation E) as valuable. In short, this would mean that the type or types
(plural) of abilities one searches for in understanding (and thus the type of
explanation that grants them) will contextually determine the truth of ‘Proof P
explains t’. This functions as a third contextual factor.
Once we read explanation as involving a recipient to which it must give
understanding (an epistemic, rather than an ontic reading), context-determining
factors were brought to the fore. We have presented two contextual factors:
(i) corpus-dependent success K and (iii) epistemic interests I. This entails that the
statement ‘Theorem t is explained by proof P’ is true (or false) in the light of three
contextual factors:
(1) Corpus-dependent success Proof P fits with the background/skill corpus K of
S such that it leads to S possessing abilities (appropriate to understanding why
the theorem is true).18 This entails that the truth of the above statement varies
contextually with type of background/skill corpus of the agent (K, K0, etc).
(2) Epistemic interests The abilities granted by proof P include those that are of
epistemic interest. The truth of the above statement varies contextually with
the epistemic standards (I, I0, etc).
(3) Explanation/understanding interests Proof P involves type(s) of explanation
E which grants understanding U, the abilities of which are deemed
appropriate to understanding why the theorem is true in this context.
Different contexts of mathematical values may determine which type(s) of
explanation (E, E0, etc) and corresponding understanding (U, U0, etc)
contextually determine the truth of the above statement.
Because no single account of mathematical explanation has, at present, managed
to capture everything that is mathematically valuable about an explanatory proof,
we believe it unwise, at present, to limit ourself to any one of them and accept a
(heuristic) pluralism about the accounts of mathematical explanation to be
considered in dubbing a proof as explanatory.
17 In this paper, we only treated the type of understanding corresponding with a type of explanation,
namely understanding why the theorem is true. However, since epistemic interests are also interests about
a ‘type’ of abilities, they could also be called a type of understanding, but the object of understanding is
different. If required, one could distinguish between explanatory understanding (E/U) and understanding
what is of epistemic interest (I/U). We may find other valuable ways to delineate a kind of understanding,
but those are outside the scope of our exploration here.
18 Furthermore, different proofs (P, P0, etc) may attain the same abilities (U) for different (or even the
same) agents.
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As mentioned in ‘‘Embracing Pluralism’’, we welcome further analysis of plural
accounts of mathematical explanation which can be tested and further developed by
case studies. Furthermore, what is at work in these cases deserves more theoretical
exploration. Since we consider a background/skill corpus as a relevant factor in
determining the context, these considerations are not restricted to a single person,
but to all those who share the relevant background/skill corpus. Community, in that
sense, seems a more apt word than agent. It also stresses the potentially high
intersubjective nature of the contextual factors. The agents of a community thus not
only share a relevant background/skill corpus, but an intersubjective agreement
about which abilities are valuable. What’s more, different communities may overlap
with respect to the contextual factors. We believe these considerations to warrant
further inquiry.
A possible tool, proposed for facilitating philosophically relevant inquiry in
general, is that of ‘style’, e.g. in Hacking’s influential paper (1992). There, Hacking
presents the notion of ‘style’ as an analytic tool for philosophers and historians of
science. He takes differing styles to denote particular ways of scientific reasoning.
Hacking has made quite some inspiring general observations—e.g. style not
necessarily being peculiar to specific man or epoch, or having generalizing versus
mere personal meaning—and has tried to distillate from a variety of historical
examples any necessary conditions for being a ‘style’ as specified. We shall here not
be going into the general discussion. Suffice it to mention that, as for mathematics,
although he does not get into much detail, Hacking points out that it too belongs
among, not above or beyond, the sciences, so style is or should as much be an issue
there. That is, to be more explicit: Several kinds of style can play a potential role
there and not the strictest of mathematical reasonings on the basis of postulation
only.
Browsing for literature on this particular topic, however, it appears that
references are few and come with big intervals as well as with hardly any
connection between them. Only very recently, Mancosu (2010) has undertaken a
preliminary attempt at a systematic treatment of the issue, to find, with a touch of
irony, that indeed it ‘is not one of the canonical areas of investigation in philosophy
of mathematics’. More investigation into this notion of style seems fruitful to get a
grasp on when communities share a background/skill corpus and epistemic interests
and can consequently be interesting for the contextual approach to explanation/
understanding. This can involve, among others, an analysis on the level of persons
(e.g. Bishop-style constructivism, Weierstrassian-style calculus), on the level of
groups or schools (e.g. the Bourbaki, or unification programs such as the Erlangen
or Langlands ones), on the level of nations (e.g. Spengler’s ‘Western’ style or
Bieberbach’s ‘Deutsche Mathematik’) or with a more methodological perspective
(e.g. direct vs. indirect style or synthetic vs. analytical style).
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